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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Karl W. Winsness, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 88-0171 
APPELLANTS BRIEF IN RESPONSE 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES IN RESPONSE TO APPELLEES BRIEF 
1. Whether Mr. Winsness, the defendant, complied with the 
marshalling requirement in his challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting his conviction. 
2. Whether this Court should consider Mr. Winsness's 
objections to the sequence of jury instructions as raised on 
appeal. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State relies is 
included in the body of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Winsness complied with the requirement that, in his 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, he marshal the 
evidence supporting the jury verdict and show that it is 
insufficient to support his conviction. There was very little 
evidence in support of the jury verdict in this case, but Mr. 
Winsness did marshal that which existed, which was insufficient to 
support his conviction. 
This Court should consider Mr. Winsness's objections to the 
sequence of jury instructions because to do so would avoid manifest 
injustice. Moreoverf constitutional issues may be considered on 
appeal even though they have not been raised below if the 
appellant's personal liberty is at stake. In the case at hand, Mr. 
Winsness's personal liberty is at stake, being sentenced to a term 
of at least five years in prison. Mr. Winsness's constitutional 
right to due process has been deprived him because the jury 
instructions were set forth in a sequence appearing to establish 
that the defense-of-habitation defense was not available to him. 
The effect of this sequence was not remedied by any subsequent 
instructions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT COMPLIED WITH THE "MARSHALLING" 
REQUIREMENT, HIS CLAIM THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS CONVICTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. 
This Court stated in Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 
P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991), that "the one challenging the verdict 
must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict." Mr. Winsness has done this. 
The only evidence presented at trial that supports the jury verdict 
is, first, that Mr. Winsness shot his gun, and second, that the 
sheriffs breaking through his door shouted their identity 
simultaneous to, or shortly after, breaking in. This evidence— 
even when marshalled and viewed in a light favorable to the jury 
verdict—is insufficient to support Mr. Winsness's conviction of 
attempted murder. 
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This Court stated in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah 
1983) that courts cannot "take a speculative leap across a 
remaining gap [in the evidence] in order to sustain a verdict." 
Furthermore, in State v. Castonquay, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 
1983), this Court "cautioned that the act in itself does not raise 
the presumption that it was done with the specific intent required 
to prove the offense." In order to prove attempted murder, the 
Court in Castonquay set forth two questions which "must be answered 
in the affirmative": 
1. Did the defendant's conduct disclose 
conscious deliberate preparation to kill...which 
was foiled only through some extraneous 
interference and not through a volitional act or 
omission on the part of the defendant? 
2. Did the defendant manifest, either by 
voicing his conscious desire, or by divulging by 
inference that this was his chosen objective...? 
Id. at 1325 (emphasis added). 
The facts supporting Mr. Winsness's conviction require a 
speculative leap from the fact that he shot his gun to the 
conclusion that he intended to kill police officers. The 
conviction relies upon Mr. Winsness's act raising "the presumption 
that it was done with the specific intent required to prove the 
offense." Id. at 1326. This over-reliance on the act itself is 
emphasized by the absence of evidence answering the two Castonquay 
questions. First, there was clearly no evidence that Mr. Winsness 
did not "foil" himself through his own volitional act; i.e., by 
deliberately shooting away from the center of the door. And 
second, the State did not present evidence that Mr. Winsness 
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"manifest[ed], either by voicing his conscious desire, or by 
divulging by inference that [murder] was his chosen objective." 
Id. at 1325. The only evidence offered is the self-serving 
testimony that the sheriffs yelled their identity either as they 
broke in or shortly after they broke in to Mr. Winsness's home. 
And yet even this testimony was not undisputed by the state's own 
witnesses, who could not agree when or even whether there was 
yelling. See Br. of App. 9. 
Viewed in a light favorable to the jury verdict, this evidence 
remains insufficient. The desire to affirm a jury verdict cannot 
drive a court to sustain speculative leaps. See Petree, 659 P.2d 
at 444-45. The State did not present evidence that Mr. Winsness 
heard any identifying shouts. Nor did the State show that Mr. 
Winsness acted in a way allowing an inference that he heard any 
shouts. Therefore, for the jury to conclude that Mr. Winsness 
heard and understood the sheriffs identify themselves required a 
speculative leap, which should not be affirmed by this Court. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT CAN AND SHOULD CONSIDER MR. WINSNESS'S 
APPEAL OBJECTING TO THE SEQUENCE OF JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
"Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be 
assigned to instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c). It has been held that if the error is 
invited, then it cannot be reviewed even to avoid a manifest 
injustice. State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah App. 1991). 
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However, in the case at handf Mr. Winsness appeals the sequence of 
the instructions, not their content. He did not request that the 
instructions be given in the sequence they were given. Therefore, 
this case does not involve an invited error, and should be 
considered by this court to avoid manifest injustice. 
Clearly, a sequence of instructions that creates the 
appearance that Mr. Winsness did not qualify for the defense-of-
habitation defense effected a manifest injustice to him. In fact, 
not only did he qualify for the defense, but he only needed to 
establish a reasonable doubt that he was actually defending his 
home and himself. The instructions, however, gave the appearance 
of strict criminal liability because the entrance by the sheriffs 
was in fact lawful.1 
In addition to Rule 19(c), this Court has the authority to 
consider constitutional issues that are raised for the first time 
on appeal if a person's liberty is at stake. State v. Jameson, 
8080 P.2d 798 (Utah 1990). Mr. Winsness's liberty is clearly at 
stake here, facing a possible life sentence in prison. 
1
 The instructions creating the unconstitutional appearance 
denying Mr. Winsness of the defense-of-habitation defense are 
numbers 25 and 26. Jury instruction #25 reads as follows (emphasis 
added): 
A person is justified in using force against another when 
he reasonably believes that the force is necessary to 
prevent or terminate the other's unlawful entry into or 
attack upon his habitation.... 
Jury instruction #26 reads as follows (emphasis added): 
You are instructed that the attempted entry of 
defendant's home by peace officers was lawful in 
accordance with a lawfully issued search warrant. 
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Mr, Winsness's due process rights, under both Utah and United 
States constitutions have been impinged by the sequence of the jury 
instructions. According to State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 
1986)f jury instructions can affect one's due process rights. In 
that case, a jury instruction explicitly created a presumption, 
relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable 
doubt of every essential element of a crime. Id. at 1370. See 
also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). This Court held 
that such an instruction was unconstitutional—despite the 
existence of other instructions that could be read to cure this 
defect—because a reasonable juror could have understood the 
instruction to create a mandatory presumption. 
In Mr. Winsness's case, the substance of the disputed 
instructions did not create such a presumption. However, the 
sequence of the instructions did, appearing to completely preempt 
his use of the defense-of-habitation defense. One instruction 
seems to say that the defense of habitation statute can only be 
used in the case of unlawful entries, and the next instruction says 
that entry in Mr. Winsness's case was lawful. This sequence had 
the effect of creating a conclusive presumption: Mr. Winsness 
could not use the defense because the entry was lawful. In fact, 
however, the lawfulness of the entry affects only the presumption 
of reasonableness. Therefore, while Mr. Winsness did not benefit 
from a presumption of reasonableness, he should have benefitted 
from from a presumption of innocence. The statute was available to 
him, requiring only that he raise a reasonable doubt as to his 
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intent. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Winsness has marshalled the evidence supporting the jury 
verdict below and shown that—even when viewed in a light favorable 
to the jury verdict-—it is insufficient to support his conviction. 
The lack of evidence supporting the jury verdict provides Mr. 
Winsness with very little evidence to marshal. Perhaps this fact 
is what motivated the State to argue that he had not satisfied this 
requirement. In fact, however, the State, and not Mr. Winsness, 
has failed to marshal sufficient evidence. In the trial belowf Mr. 
Winsness was convicted because the jury instructions gave the 
appearance that he was strictly liable, and not because the State 
had adduced sufficient evidence to convince a jury beyond 
reasonable doubt. 
For these reasons, Mr. Winsness respectfully requests this 
Court to reverse his conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ 7 day of February, 1992. 
•S33COTidh J. Chacon 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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